The rate at which a mine detection system falsely identifies man-made or natural clutter objects as mines is referred to as the system's false alarm rate (FAR). Generally expressed as a rate per unit area or time, the FAR is one of the primary metrics used to gauge system performance. In this report, an overview is given of statistical methods appropriate for the analysis of data relating to FAR. Techniques are presented for determining a suitable size for the clutter collection area, for summarizing the performance of a single sensor, and for comparing different sensors. For readers requiring more thorough coverage of the topics discussed, references to the statistical literature are provided. A companion report addresses statistical issues related to the estimation of mine detection probabilities. 
-INTRODUCTION
The primary statistical metrics used to assess performance for mine detection systems are related to the probability of detecting actual targets (PD), and the false alarm rate (FAR). A companion report [Simonson, 1998 ] outlines some of the standard statistical techniques and concepts used in assessing PD. In this paper, models and calculations used to quantify the false alarm rate are discussed. These methods can be useful both in designing tests of mine detection systems, and an analyzing the data collected during such exercises.
In target recognition applications, every detection is classified as "true" or "false". A detection is said to be true if an actual target (mine) is present at or near the indicated location.
Otherwise, it is false. When controlled tests of mine detection systems are conducted, the investigator knows the number, type, and location of actual mines encountered by each system. Thus, it is sensible to characterize performance on target mines in terms of PD, with inferences based on the ratio of the number of detections to the number of targets emplaced. Typically, PD varies with mine type and size.
All true detections are, by definition, caused by target mines. By contrast, false detections may arise from two different sources: known decoy objects (e.g., bolts, cans) intentionally buried at surveyed locations in the range of the sensor, and the background characteristics and natural variability of the test region itself. In order to ensure that experiments designed to test multiple detection systems are unbiased, it is important to distinguish between these two sources.
During detection system tests, decoys (or "confusers") are sometimes emplaced to provide diagnostic information about the types of objects that can cause a system to false alarm.
A discrete number of items is emplaced, and the detection probability can be estimated separately for each different type of object. This probability may be referred to as the "probability of a false alarm" (PFA) for the particular decoy type. Statistically, it is equivalent to the "probability of detection" for a particular target type, and may be analyzed in the same manner, using the methods outlined in Simonson [1998] . The distinction between PD and PFA is that a high-performing system will have a high PD for relevant targets and a low PFA for common non-targets.
The analysis of "clutter" or "background" false alarms (those representing neither an actual mine nor a known decoy) proceeds differently. Because the investigator is unlikely to have a full characterization of the subsurface of the test region, the cause of false alarms not corresponding to decoy objects is generally unknown. Depending on the particular sensor used, false alarms may be due to rocks, pockets of loose sand, small metal scraps, buried organic material, or other subsurface phenomena. Rather than try to assign a cause to each such detection during the test, the investigator simply notes how many of them occur. Coupled with information about the area (or time) covered by the sensor, this data can be used to characterize the rate at which false detections occur in clutter. The purpose of this report is to introduce appropriate statistical methods for assessing such rates.
Figure 1 may help to clarify the distinctions between detections due to targets, decoys, and clutter. The schematic plot shows the spatial layout of an experiment designed to estimate PD for three different target types, PFA for two different decoy types, and FAR for one region that is assumed to be fairly homogeneous. Data related to all three measures is collected in a single run of a sensor over the full test region. Each detection is classified as to cause (known target, known decoy, or unknown clutter) and the analysis proceeds separately for each type.
In the next section, the Poisson model for data related to clutter false alarm rates is introduced. Computations used in estimating the false alarm rate of a single detector are described in section 3. Methods for constructing confidence intervals, conducting hypothesis tests, and specifying the size of the study area are all covered. A technique for comparing the false alarm rates of two different systems is given in section 4. Graphical methods for presenting results related to PD and FAR simultaneously are presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes the report with a few additional considerations for data analysis.
-THE POISSON MODEL

-Background and Assumptions
The Poisson distribution [Johnson, Kotz, and Kemp, 1992; Ripley, 1981] and the closely related Poisson process [Çinlar, 1975; Taylor and Karlin, 1994] are often used to model experimental data related to occurrence rates as a function of time or area. While this report focuses on spatial rates, extension to temporal rates is straightforward.
For applications in mine detection, the experimenter must develop a sensible protocol for determining what constitutes a detection. In addition, rules are needed for determining when a detection corresponds to a known object (target mine or decoy) and when it is a clutter false alarm. Typically, if a detection occurs at a point on the surface lying within a circle of fixed radius about the surface point corresponding to the center of a known buried object, that detection is characterized as being due to the buried object. (For analytical purposes, multiple detections occurring within the same circle are generally treated as a single detection.) To compensate for targets of different size, the radius of each detection region is adjusted to the dimensions of the corresponding object. In order to eliminate ambiguity when assigning causes to detections, decoys and mine targets should be emplaced in such a manner that their detection regions do not overlap. Detections occurring outside of all target and decoy circles are classified as clutter false alarms.
In analyzing false alarm rates, two basic measurements are used. The first measurement is the number of clutter false alarms occurring while a detection system is under test. The second measurement is the difference between the total area covered by the sensor, and the combined area of all covered regions corresponding to targets and decoys. This latter figure represents the area of the region covered within which any detection occurring would be characterized as a clutter false alarm. It is referred to as the clutter area. Note that all decoy detections are omitted from the clutter false alarm count, and all regions lying within decoy detection circles are excluded from the clutter area. This allows the experimenter planning a test comparing several different systems to include decoys that are attractive to one sensor only, without biasing the reported false alarm rates.
The Poisson model assumes that each detection system being tested has a fixed (but unknown) rate of clutter false alarms per unit area. In statistics, this rate is usually represented by the parameter λ, and is referred to as the intensity of the clutter false alarm process. It is assumed that λ is constant across the test region.
Some discussion of this assumption is in order. To ensure that valid estimates of the FAR can be obtained, tests should be conducted in regions that are believed to be fairly homogeneous. When substantial variation is known to exist, due to factors like changing surface vegetation or moisture content, clay versus sandy soil, or shade versus direct sunlight, the full test region should be divided into smaller sub-regions for performance analysis. A different false alarm rate is then computed for each set of conditions, and statistical tests (see Section 4) can be conducted to determine whether the various environmental factors significantly affect performance.
-Notation
Suppose that a mine detection system has a true intensity of λ false alarms per unit area under certain conditions. In a system test, let R be the total area covered by the sensor, while the combined area of all regions corresponding to mine targets is R T , and the combined area of all regions corresponding to decoys is R D . The clutter area, R C , is equal to R − R T − R D . Let K be a random variable representing the number of clutter false detections; K is said to have the Poisson distribution with parameter λR C [Çinlar, 1975; Johnson, Kotz, and Kemp, 1992] . It is of interest to make inferences about the intensity λ.
According to the Poisson model, the probability of observing k clutter false alarms is given by:
The quantity K /R C is an estimator of the unknown λ. The uncertainty in this estimator decreases as the clutter area covered increases: an experiment measuring 50 clutter false alarms in 100 square meters is more informative than an experiment giving a single false alarm in two square meters. The mean and variance of K /R C are as follows [Johnson, Kotz, and Kemp, 1992] :
.
The variance [Larsen and Marx, 1981 ] is a common measure of the uncertainty present in an estimator. The quantity (3) decreases as R C increases, demonstrating that experiments covering a large clutter area will provide more certain information than smaller experiments.
Intensity also affects variance: for a fixed clutter area, variance increases with λ.
-ESTIMATION AND TESTING FOR A SINGLE POISSON PARAMETER
-Confidence Intervals for λ λ
As discussed in Simonson [1998] , it is common practice among statisticians, scientists, and engineers to report parameter estimates along with uncertainty measures in the form of confidence intervals. Each such interval is associated with a specified degree of confidence, representing the a priori probability that the interval will contain the true parameter value.
Informally speaking, 95% confidence intervals are constructed in such a manner that they will have a 95% chance of containing the true value. Formal definitions of confidence intervals can be found in numerous texts [Bickel and Doksum, 1977; Cox and Hinkley, 1974; Silvey, 1975] .
The degree of confidence in an interval is frequently represented algebraically in terms of the quantity α, which is equal to one minus the a priori probability that the interval will contain the true parameter value. Thus, for a 95% confidence interval, α is equal to 0.05. The standard notational convention uses the expression 100(1 − α)% to represent the certainty corresponding to a generic confidence interval.
Two different approaches are employed to construct confidence intervals for a single
Poisson parameter, λ. When the number of detections is large, the (continuous) normal distribution is used to approximate the (discrete) Poisson [Larsen and Marx, 1981; Johnson, Kotz, and Kemp, 1992] . This approximation makes the construction of confidence intervals straightforward for large false alarm counts. For small counts, the normal approximation is inappropriate and a different format for confidence intervals is required. The large sample method is acceptable when the number of clutter detections exceeds 15 [Johnson, Kotz, and Kemp, 1992] .
-Small Sample Approach
The small sample method for computing confidence intervals for the Poisson parameter is as follows. Denote the lower limit of an interval by Λ L , and denote the upper limit by Λ U . If k false alarms occur in a clutter region of area R C , an approximate 100(1 − α)% confidence interval for λ is defined by [Hald, 1952; Johnson, Kotz, and Kemp, 1992] :
Here the quantity (4) and (5) (4) and (5).
-Large Sample Approach
The large-sample method of computing confidence intervals uses the normal approximation to the Poisson distribution. When k exceeds 15 clutter false alarms, an approximate 100(1 − α)% confidence interval for λ is given by [Johnson, Kotz, and Kemp, 1992] :
Here, the quantity 2 / 1 α − z represents the quantile of the standard normal distribution corresponding to probability 1 − α/2. For example, to get a 95% confidence interval, choose α = 0.05, and use the value z 0.975 = 1.960 in equations (6) and (7). Tables of the standard normal distribution are found in many statistics textbooks [e.g. Larsen and Marx, 1981] , and are readily available from most commercial statistical software packages. shown are computed using Equations (6) and (7). As in the small sample case (Figure 2 ), the confidence interval widths computed here vary with both k and R C .
-Hypothesis Tests
Statistical tests provide a mechanism for choosing among two conflicting hypotheses about the model underlying an observed data set [Koopmans, 1987; Silvey, 1975 ]. The null hypothesis (H 0 ) is accepted in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary. The alternative hypothesis (H 1 ) is accepted when experimental data are deemed to be inconsistent with H 0 . The probability of rejecting H 0 when H 0 is true is referred to as the level of a test, and is often denoted by α.
In the case of a single Poisson parameter, one may wish to test whether observed data are consistent with the hypothesis that λ is equal to some specified value, λ 0 . The appropriate null and alternative hypotheses are given by:
, :
and the following test statistic is used:
Here,
is the observed false alarm rate. If the null hypothesis is true, the statistic (9) has a distribution that is approximately standard normal for large k (greater than 15) [Johnson, The test statistic (9) is based on the normal approximation to the Poisson distribution and is only appropriate when the number of false alarms is large. For small k, the recommended testing procedure would be to reject (8a) for values of λ 0 not lying in the small-sample confidence interval computed from (4) and (5).
-Clutter Area Calculation
The normal approximation to the Poisson distribution can be used to calculate the approximate clutter area needed to keep the uncertainty in estimates of λ below some specified level. Here, uncertainty is expressed in terms of 100(1 − α)% confidence interval width. The experimenter begins by specifying an observed clutter false alarm rate, 0 λ , and a tolerable confidence interval width, W, corresponding to 0 λ . From equations (6) and (7), the width of a 100(1 − α)% confidence interval on λ, when the observed proportion is λˆ, is given by:
Setting the width equal to the desired value W, and solving (10) for R C gives:
As an example, to obtain confidence intervals with width no greater than 0.10 for an observed clutter false alarm rate of 0 λ = 0.5 per m 2 , it follows from (11) that the clutter area must cover at least 771 square meters.
Of course, during the test planning phase the investigator will not know the observed FAR. Thus, the choice of an appropriate value of 0 λ for use in (11) is not clear. One option is to select a value that is believed to be a reasonable upper bound. Because (11) increases with 0 λ , this approach will give a conservative estimate of the required clutter area.
-COMPARING TWO POISSON PROPORTIONS
In practical applications of mine detection technology, false alarms can be costly in dollars, time, and operational success. Thus, the development of new sensors and processing methods with reduced false alarm rates is a goal of much ongoing research. Determining when one sensor has significantly out-performed another is an important step in the analysis of data from a multi-system demonstration or test. In this section, a statistical hypothesis test for comparing the performances of two different sensors is discussed. The same technique may also be used to assess the performance of a single system under different experimental conditions (e.g., dry sandy soil versus wet clay), or in different replications of the same system over the same clutter region.
-An Hypothesis Test for Two Poisson Rates
Suppose that system A covers a clutter area of + k B ) and examines the percentage of this total that is due to each system [Hald, 1952; Lampton, 1994] . Let π A represent the probability that any one false alarm is due to system A.
Conditional on the total number of false alarms, the experimental data may be viewed as a series of k A + k B binomial trials, with two possible outcomes (system A or system B) at each trial. The probability of system A is equal to π A at every trial.
Under the null hypothesis (12a) the clutter false alarm rates underlying the two systems are the same, and π A should therefore be equal to:
which is simply the percentage of the total clutter area that was covered by system A. Under this framework, the hypotheses given in (12) are equivalent to:
Methods for testing hypotheses about a single binomial proportion are discussed in Simonson [1998] . If both ) (
exceed five, the test statistic:
may be used. When the null hypothesis (14a) is true, s has a distribution that is approximately standard normal [Fleiss, 1981] . If H 1 is true, (15) will tend to be large. An α-level test rejects H 0 when s exceeds the quantile of the standard normal distribution corresponding to probability 1 − α/2.
As an example of the method, suppose that system A covered a clutter area of In applying the method outlined in this section to experimental data, it is important to be aware of the assumptions used to derive the statistic (15). Specifying )
implies that the two systems were tested under equivalent conditions. If system A were tested in a more challenging environment than system B, (15) would not represent a fair test of the relative performances of the two systems. Ideally, the two systems should cover the same clutter region, so that
R . In many experimental situations, this is not possible. However, every effort should be made to ensure that the conditions encountered by the two systems are comparable.
-SUMMARY PERFORMANCE MEASURES: PD, PFA, AND FAR
As discussed in this report and the companion document [Simonson, 1998 ], the common metrics used to characterize the performance of detection systems are PD (the probability of detection), PFA (the probability of a false alarm), and FAR (the false alarm rate). All three are of vital interest, and they must be considered together in evaluating detection systems. A system that achieves a high PD but is subject to frequent false alarms may have little value in timecritical applications. Conversely, a system that rarely makes false detections but misses a substantial proportion of real mines is unlikely to gain acceptance among users. In this section, some methods are presented for graphically summarizing system performance for targets, decoys, and clutter. Figure 4 is an example of a display style that can be used to show detection rates, along with confidence intervals, for different types of known objects. The viewer can see at a glance that the hypothetical sensor in question had little difficulty in detecting large and small metal mines, but frequently missed plastic mines. While it rarely false alarmed on the wooden decoys, it misclassified bolts as targets about 60% of the time. Due to the relatively small number of decoy objects utilized, the 95% confidence intervals for PFA on the decoys were considerably wider than intervals characterizing PD for mine targets. Variations of this general type of plot can be used to display the performance of multiple sensors on the same test data, or the performance a single sensor under varying experimental conditions. In producing such a plot, it is implicitly assumed that the same detection threshold was used across all target and decoy types.
For many detection systems, the primary output at any given point in space is not a binary (mine/no mine) decision, but rather a continuous one-dimensional variable that is thresholded to determine whether or not a detection has occurred. This variable may simply be the magnitude of a received physical or chemical signal, or it may represent a measure of the similarity between the received signal and a known signal that is characteristic of targets. For such data, it is common to display sensor performance in terms of PD and FAR, as a function of a varying threshold. Displays of this type are called receiver-operator characteristic (ROC) curves [Andrews, George, and Altshuler, 1997; Poor, 1988] .
Assume that the variable in question tends to be large in the presence of the target. When a threshold level is chosen, detection is said to occur at each location in the test region giving a value at or above this level. As the threshold is reduced, the number of detections increases.
ROC curves are constructed by varying the threshold, and plotting observed false alarm rate (per unit area) versus observed PD. The points representing PD/FAR pairs are then connected to give a smooth-looking curve. Figure 5 is an example summarizing the performance of a hypothetical sensor for small metallic mines under two different conditions: dry sandy soil, and wet sandy soil. For each condition, the PD corresponding to any given FAR can be read from the appropriate curve. For example, with a FAR of one per 100 m 2 , the sensor achieves a PD of 100% for dry soil and about 78% for wet soil. Multiple curves can be used to graphically illustrate performance differences observed across various sensor types, target types, and experimental conditions.
-DISCUSSION
This report and its companion [Simonson, 1998] Box, Hunter, and Hunter (1978) and Cox (1958) .
The first step in analyzing data from multi-factor experiments often involves using the analysis of variance to determine which factors (and combinations of factors) significantly impact performance. While ANOVA is a familiar and widely used technique, it is based on several assumptions that may be questionable for mine detection data. In particular, the response variable is assumed to be normally distributed. When the actual response represents a percentage of mines detected, the exact distribution is binomial and the normal approximation may be inadequate if the observed percentage is close to zero or one, or if the number of target mines emplaced is small. In such cases, it is necessary to transform the observed percentages to a new domain in which the normality assumption is more nearly met. The book by Box, Hunter, and Hunter (1978) provides an excellent introduction to the mathematics of ANOVA. The collection edited by Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey (1991) discusses a number of more advanced topics, including transformation and graphical display.
It is hoped that the material covered in the present report and its companion, along with the referenced statistical literature, will provide some useful guidance to the mine detection community in the areas of experimental planning and statistical data analysis. (6) and (7). Results are shown for a hypothetical sensor tested against three different types of mine targets and two types of decoys. For each target or decoy type, the observed detection percentage is shown as a solid dot and the corresponding uncertainty is represented in terms of a 95% confidence interval. To provide the viewer with some information about the experimental design, the number of times each object type was encountered is also listed.
Figure 5 -Sample ROC curve. The curve illustrates the performance of a hypothetical sensor against a specific target type (small metallic mines) under two different environments. For each test condition, 31 target mines were encountered, and a clutter area of 1000 square meters was covered. For a clutter area of this size, false alarm rates below 0.001/m 2 cannot be estimated, so the curves are left truncated at this point.
